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I. APPROPRIATION ART 
In a little, largely-overlooked paperback anthology published in 
1973, there is an essay on New England artist Hank Herron.1  
Herron, the article tells us, for his one-man show had reproduced 
the entire oeuvre of minimalist painter and printmaker Frank 
Stella.2  In so doing, Herron was judged to have created something 
more than Stella: “in their real meanings, these objects are Stellas 
plus.”3  The crucial difference between an original Stella and a 
visually indistinguishable Herron, we are told, comes on further 
consideration of the artists’ respective projects: “one begins to be 
more profoundly conscious of and receptive to a radically new and 
philosophical element in the work of Mr. Herron that is precluded 
in the work of Mr. Stella, i.e., the denial of originality.”4 
 
       Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Susquehanna University, Selinsgrove, Pa. 
 1 Cheryl Bernstein, The Fake as More, in IDEA ART: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 41, 41 
(Gregory Battcock ed., 1973).  
 2 See id. at 42. 
 3 Id. at 42. 
 4 Id. at 44–45.  
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With his method and apparent philosophical approach, Herron 
would be characterized today as an appropriation artist—if he 
existed, which he didn’t.  Nor did the attributed author of the 
article, Cheryl Bernstein.  Both Herron and Bernstein were 
inventions of art historian, Carol Duncan, a hoax that went 
undetected for over a decade.5  On this realization, one might think 
that Duncan’s game was a clever reductio ad absurdum, taking the 
direction of postmodern art to its hypothetical end to illustrate the 
inanity of the whole project.  And this may have been the case.  
But, perhaps unknown to Duncan, the fictional Herron’s project 
largely parallels the work of real-life artist Elaine Sturtevant, active 
at the time of Duncan’s writing, and probably the earliest artist to 
be labeled an appropriation artist.6  Although she did not attempt to 
reproduce any single artist’s body of work, Sturtevant (as she 
prefers to be called) reproduced works by the likes of Roy 
Lichtenstein, Jasper Johns, Andy Warhol, and yes, Frank Stella.7  
Typically, Sturtevant would repaint another artist’s painting from 
memory, usually inserting some hidden “error” in her version.8  
However, in one famous case, Sturtevant obtained from Warhol 
the silkscreens he used to create his series of “Flowers” prints, and 
used these to create indistinguishable duplicates.9  When her 1967 
reproduction of Claes Oldenburg’s Store incited hostility from the 
 
 5 Duncan’s hoax was ultimately uncovered by another art historian, Thomas Crow.  
See Thomas Crow, The Return of Hank Herron, in ENDGAME 11, 11–16 (Yve-Alain Bois 
et al. eds., 1986).  Duncan has caught many in her web. See, e.g., Alan Tormey, 
Transfiguring the Commonplace, 33 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 213, 214 (1974) 
(quoting “critic Cheryl Berstein”); Gregory L. Ulmer, Borges and Conceptual Art, 5 
BOUNDARY 2 845, 847 (1977) (same); Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the Myth of 
Objectivity: The Idea-Expression Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value 
Judgments, 66 IND. L.J.175, 231 n.231 (1990) (citing Bernstein). 
 6 See Bruce Hainley, Erase and Rewind, FRIEZE, June 6, 2000, available at 
http://www.frieze.com/issue/article/erase_and_rewind/77. Sturtevant herself has resisted 
this label. 
 7 See Dan Cameron, A Conversation: A Salon History of Appropriation with Leo 
Castelli and Elaine Sturtevant, 134 FLASH ART 76, 76 (1988), available at 
http://www.flashartonline.com/interno.php?pagina=articolo_det&id_art=816&det=ok&tit
le=A-CONVERSATION; Hainley, supra note 6.  
 8 Bill Arning, Sturtevant, 2 J. CONTEMPORARY ART 39, 46 (1989); Cameron, supra 
note 7. 
 9 See Cameron, supra note 7; Hainley, supra note 6.  
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art community (and particularly from Oldenburg himself),10 
Sturtevant disappeared from the art world for over a decade, during 
which time a number of young artists took up the task of art 
appropriation.11 
Appropriation art traces its conceptual origins back to an 
artistic movement and to a philosophical paradigm shift.12  The 
artistic movement in question began with the “readymades” of 
Marcel Duchamp, works consisting entirely of ordinary objects 
found or purchased by the artist, and presented largely unchanged 
as art.13  Duchamp’s most famous readymade, Fountain, consists 
of a common porcelain urinal, upended, and signed with the 
pseudonym, “R. Mutt 1917.”14  Duchamp’s work presented a 
conceptual breakthrough in modern art, opening the doors for 
artists to select objects from the world around them, rather than 
fabricating paint, clay, and bronze into new art objects.15 
The philosophical origin of appropriation art came half a 
century later, in a 1967 essay by Roland Barthes, “The Death of 
the Author.”16  In the famous essay, Barthes rails against the age-
old notion that the author or artist is the arbiter of a work’s 
meaning.17  So far as meaning is concerned, Barthes suggests, the 
author “dies” when the work is released to the public, and becomes 
just another reader.18  Another philosopher, Michel Foucault, 
following the same line of thought, suggests that imposing an 
author—a Romantic invention, he asserts—on a work limits the 
meaning of the work.19  On this basis, authors and artists began to 
 
 10 See Cameron, supra note 7. 
 11 See Hainley, supra note 6 
 12 See Francis M. Naumann, Duchamp, Marcel, in  GROVE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AM. ART 
97, 102 (Joan M. Marter ed., 2011); Appropriation, MoMALearning, http:// 
www.moma.org/learn/moma_learning/themes/pop-art/appropriation (last visited Jan. 28, 
2013). 
 13 See Naumann, supra note 12, at 97, 102.  
 14 See Naumann, supra note 12, at 100.  
 15 See, e.g., Naumann, supra note 12, at 101. 
 16 See ROLAND BARTHES, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE, MUSIC, TEXT 142, 142, 
146 (1977). 
 17 See id. at 142, 143, 148.  
 18 See id. at 142, 148.  
 19 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, What is an Author?, in LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY, 
PRACTICE 124, 134, 137–38 (Donald F. Bouchard ed., 1977). 
C01_HICK (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2013  3:33 PM 
1158 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 23:1155 
question the nature of authorship, and attempted to distance 
themselves from it.20  One might have difficulty labeling 
Duchamp’s readymades “art,”21 or question the validity of Barthes’ 
and Foucault’s claims,22 but the influence of Duchamp and Barthes 
is, in a word, inestimable. 
While Sturtevant was on hiatus, a number of New York artists 
began experimenting with art appropriation.23  Sherrie Levine, 
perhaps best known for her series “After Walker Evans,” famously 
re-photographs others’ photographs24—in this case, the depression-
era portraits taken by Evans.  Richard Prince became famous re-
photographing advertisements—especially Marlboro ads depicting 
the “Marlboro Man”—cropping out visual and textual indications 
that these were advertisements.25  Jeff Koons, meanwhile, turned to 
what he took to be objects of everyday commercial banality, his 
most famous work being a 1986 stainless-steel replica of an 
inflatable toy rabbit, Rabbit.26  For those familiar with copyright 
law, it will perhaps seem ironic that the legal troubles for 
appropriation artists began in earnest when they strayed from such 
straightforward appropriation.27 
 
 20 See Sherri Irvin, Appropriation and Authorship in Contemporary Art, 45 BRIT. J. 
AESTHETICS 123, 123–24, 126 (2005). 
 21 See Naumann, supra note 12, at 98; Rob Sharp, The Loo that Shook the World: 
Duchamp, Man Ray, Picabi, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 20, 2008), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/art/features/the-loo-that-shook-the-
world-duchamp-man-ray-picabi-784384.html.  However, a 2004 survey of British art 
experts named Fountain the most influential work in the history of modern art.  See 
Duchamp’s Urinal Tops Art Survey, BBC NEWS (Dec. 1, 2004, 5:56 PM), 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/4059997.stm. 
 22 Many have.  See E.D. HIRSCH, JR., VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION 1–4 (1967). 
 23 See Andrew Russeth, The Original: Doing the Elastic Tango with Sturtevant, 
GALLERISTNY (May 8, 2012, 6:16 PM), http://galleristny.com/2012/05/the-original-
doing-the-elastic-tango-with-sturtevant/ (interviewing Sturtevant and discussing the rise 
of appropriation art during her hiatus).  
 24 See John Carlin, Culture Vultures: Artistic Appropriation and Intellectual Property 
Law, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 103, 137–38 (1988). 
25      Klaus Ottmann, Prince, Richard, in GROVE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AM. ART 194, 194 
(Joan M. Marter ed., 2011). 
 26 See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 305 (2d Cir. 1992).  
 27 See Carlin, supra note 24, at 137 (noting that some appropriation artists have drawn 
legal attention which has not made it to court.  Levine, for instance, reportedly ceased re-
photographing images by photographer Edward Weston when Weston’s estate threatened 
to sue).  
C01_HICK (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2013  3:33 PM 
2013] APPROPRIATION AND TRANSFORMATION 1159 
II. LEGAL TROUBLES 
Jeff Koons’ exhibition, “The Banality Show,” opened at New 
York’s Sonnabend Gallery in 1988.28  For the show, Koons had 
commissioned a number of three-dimensional sculptures in wood 
and porcelain from artisans around the world.  The sculptures are 
based on images of popular culture Koons had culled from 
postcards, cartoon strips, and elsewhere.29  The Banality Show 
immediately garnered no fewer than three copyright infringement 
suits against Koons and the gallery.30  The first of these centered 
on Koons’ sculpture, String of Puppies, a life-sized painted 
wooden sculpture (in four editions) depicting, from the knees up, a 
couple sitting on a bench  holding a litter of eight blue puppies 
with comically large noses.31  The couple is dressed in brightly 
colored clothes, with daisies in their hair. 
String of Puppies was based on a black-and-white photograph 
by Art Rogers, “Puppies,” which had originally been 
commissioned by an acquaintance of Rogers’, and later licensed by 
Museum Graphics for a notecard.32  Koons purchased a copy of the 
card at a commercial card shop, believing it “typical, 
commonplace and familiar”—a paradigm of popular commercial 
culture.33  Koons tore the copyright notice from the card and sent it 
along with an enlarged photocopy and a chart to the Demetz Studio 
in Ortessi, Italy, with instructions to craft a sculpture of the couple 
and puppies depicted in the photograph.34  Koons oversaw the 
sculpting and painting of String of Puppies, providing written 
instructions specifying that, aside from the color, the puppies’ 
 
 28 See Rogers, 960 F.2d at 304. 
 29 See United Feature Syndicate Inc., v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 
(explaining the artistic intent and materials used by Koons in “The Banality Show”).  
 30 See, e.g., Rogers, 960 F.2d at 305; United Feature Syndicate, Inc., 817 F. Supp. at 
372; Campbell v. Koons, No. 91 Civ. 6055(RO), 1993 WL 97381 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 
1993).  
 31 See Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d, 960 F.2d 301 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992). 
 32 See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d at 304. 
 33 See id. at 305.  
 34 See id. at 305.  
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noses, and the daisies, the sculpture should accurately replicate the 
scene depicted in the photograph.35 
Rogers learned of Koons’ sculpture in 1989 and filed suit 
against Koons and the Sonnabend Gallery, alleging copyright 
infringement and unfair competition.36  The district court found 
that String of Puppies did, indeed, infringe on Rogers’ photograph, 
and did not qualify as a fair use.37  The court granted summary 
judgment and ordered Koons and the Sonnabend Gallery to turn 
over all infringing articles to Rogers, and enjoined the defendants 
from making, selling, lending, or displaying any copies of the 
sculpture, or any other derivative works based on “Puppies.”38  
Koons appealed and the court of appeals affirmed the district 
court’s decision.39 
Koons’ central defense was made on the basis of fair use, 
centrally arguing that String of Puppies qualified as a parody,40 
specifically “a satire or parody of society at large.”41  A defense of 
fair use rests on § 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976, which lays 
out four non-exclusive, non-exhaustive factors upon which 
consideration of “fair” use traditionally rests: (1) the purpose and 
character of the use, (2) the nature of the copyrighted work, (3) the 
amount and substantiality of the work used, and (4) the effect of 
the use on the market value of the original.42 
Arising from the 1841 case of Folsom v. Marsh,43 the fair use 
doctrine was ultimately codified in the Copyright Act to help 
balance creators’ interests with those of the users of copyrighted 
works in situations where strictly enforcing copyright would 
 
 35 See id. at 305.  
 36 See id.  
 37 See Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. at 480. 
 38 See id. at 306. 
 39 See id. 
 40 Koons also argued that what he copied from “Puppies” did not meet the definition of 
an original work of authorship under the law. See id. at 309.  On the long-established 
basis of Burrow-Giles Lithograph Co. v. Sarony (11 U.S. 53 (1884)), however, the 
district court found the contents of “Puppies” protected by copyright, and the court of 
appeals confirmed. See id. at 306–08. 
 41 See id. at 309. 
 42 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 43 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). 
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hinder, rather than advance, the “Progress of Science and useful 
Arts”44 that copyright law was designed to promote.45  Nothing in 
the Act specifies that the four factors should be considered of equal 
weight, nor whether they should be considered individually or 
holistically.46  Rather, the fair use doctrine was designed for 
maximum flexibility, requiring case-by-case analysis by the 
judiciary.47 
Section 107, which encodes the fair use doctrine, explicitly 
cites “purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching . . . scholarship, or research” as examples of 
presumptively fair uses.48  This illustrative list has made special 
room for cases of parody, taken to be a valuable form of criticism, 
and central to the purposes of fair use.49  Parody has come to be 
roughly defined, for legal purposes, as a work which, in imitating a 
preexisting work, ridicules that very work.50  The first of the four 
factors—the purpose and character of the use—explicitly considers 
“whether such use is of a commercial nature.”51  Commercial uses 
have been established by the Supreme Court as presumptively 
unfair.52  However, where a work is found to be parodic, its 
 
 44 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 45 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 46 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (failing to state how the four factors of fair use should 
be utilized); see also Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S.  at 476.  
 47 This flexibility has resulted in what at least one court calls “the most troublesome 
[doctrine] in the whole of copyright.” Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 
(2d Cir. 1939); see also Darren Hudson Hick, Mystery and Misdirection: Some Problems 
of Fair Use and Users’ Rights, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 485, 485 (2009). 
 48 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 49 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 569 (1994) (finding that 
“parody, like other comment and criticism, may claim fair use.”); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 
677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that an allegedly infringing song was an 
infringement of the copyrighted song because it did not constitute as fair use since it was 
not a parody of the copyrighted material). 
 50 See MCA, Inc., 677 F.2d at 184–85 (explaining that a song sung to the tune of a 
copyrighted song by a satirical comedy program was a parody). 
 51 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 52 See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) 
(explaining that “every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an 
unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the 
copyright”). 
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commerciality has generally been considered a non-issue.53  The 
second factor is traditionally taken to distinguish between works of 
fact and works of fiction, such that the more “creative” the 
original, the more this factor tends to weigh against a finding of 
fair use.54  In cases of parody, however, the original is usually a 
creative work, and so, given the potential cultural value of parody, 
this factor tends to be disregarded in parody cases.55  The third 
factor asks what, and how much, of the original has been taken in a 
secondary work.56  Because parody, by its nature, typically 
requires substantial copying—and often copying the “heart” of the 
work—courts have generally given leeway in the amount copied 
for a parody such as would be required to conjure up the original 
work.57  Finally, the fourth factor asks about the effect of the 
secondary use on the market value of the original.58  Although the 
purpose of criticism—parody included—is often to devalue the 
original, the Supreme Court has found that parody that suppresses 
sales of the original is permissible, whereas works that, by 
copying, usurp the original are not.59 
 
 53 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584–85 (explaining that the “commercial . . . character of 
a work is ‘not conclusive’ (quoting Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 448) but rather a fact to be 
‘weighed along with others in fair use decisions’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 
(1976)); see also Roxana Badin, An Appropriate(d) Place in Transformative Value: 
Appropriation Art’s Exclusion from Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 60 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1653, 1653 (1995) (explaining that the Supreme Court’s “elimination of the 
commercial presumption . . . is limited to works that convey a parodic purpose.”). 
 54 See New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D. 
N.J. 1977) (finding that defendants had “greater license . . . under the fair use doctrine” to 
use portions of a copyrighted work that was more a factual work than a creative work). 
 55 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (explaining that the second factor regarding the 
nature of the work is not “ever likely to help much in separating the fair use sheep from 
the infringing goats in a parody case, since parodies almost invariably copy publicly 
known, expressive works.”) 
 56 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 57 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588 (explaining that “parody presents a difficult case” 
because it “necessarily springs from recognizable allusion to its object through distorted 
imitation. . . . it must be able to ‘conjure up’ at least enough of that original work to make 
the object of its critical wit recognizable”).  
 58 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 59 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591–92 (explaining that “when a lethal parody . . . kills 
demand for the original, it does not produce a harm cognizable under the Copyright Act. . 
. . [T]he role of the courts is to distinguish between ‘[b]iting criticism that [merely 
suppresses] demand [and] copyright infringement[, which] usurps it.” (quoting Fisher v. 
Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986)).. 
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On these bases, once it is established that a secondary use is 
parodic in nature, much in the fair use doctrine is interpreted by the 
courts to align in favor of the use.60  In the case of Rogers v. 
Koons, however, the court found that String of Puppies did not 
qualify as parody under the law: 
It is the rule in this Circuit that satire need not be 
only of the copied work and may, as appellants urge 
of “String of Puppies,” also be a parody of modern 
society, the copied work must be, at least in part, an 
object of the parody, otherwise there would be no 
need to conjure up the original work. . . . We think 
this is a necessary rule, as were it otherwise there 
would be no real limitation on the copier’s use of 
another’s copyrighted work to make a statement on 
some aspect of society at large.  If an infringement 
of copyrightable expression could be justified as 
fair use solely on the basis of the infringer’s claim 
to a higher or different artistic use—without 
insuring public awareness of the original work—
there would be no practicable boundary to the fair 
use defense. . . . The problem in the instant case is 
that even given that “String of Puppies” is a satirical 
critique of our materialistic society, it is difficult to 
discern any parody of the photograph “Puppies” 
itself.61 
Without the label of “parody” to align them in favor of the 
secondary work, all four factors of fair use were found to weigh 
against String of Puppies, and Koons’ use of the photograph was 
found to be unfair and infringing.62  The decision seemed to signal 
 
 60 See Berlin v. E. C. Publ’ns., Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (holding that “where . . . the 
parody has neither the intent nor the effect of fulfilling the demand for the original, and 
where the parodist does not appropriate a greater amount of the original work than is 
necessary to ‘recall or conjure up’ the object of his satire, a finding of infringement 
would be improper.”); Hick, supra note 47, at 499 (stating that the fair use doctrine does 
allow for parody). 
 61 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 305 (2d Cir. 1992) 
 62 See id. at 310–12 (finding that “the first factor of the fair use doctrine cuts against a 
finding of fair use . . . th[e second] factor militates against a finding of fair use . . . no 
reasonable jury could conclude that Koons did not exceed a permissible level of copying 
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a death knell for appropriation art.63  Art theorists reeled.  Lynne 
A. Greenberg summarized the outlook: “[T]he effect of the case is 
to act as a powerful check on appropriation artists.  Because the 
stakes under copyright law for appropriating imagery from a 
copyrighted work are now so high, it is likely that many artists will 
steer clear of using such techniques in their future work.”64 
With Rogers v. Koons decided, Koons’ other pending cases fell 
much the same way.  His porcelain sculpture, Wild Boy and Puppy, 
was found to have infringed on the character Odie from the 
Garfield comic strip,65 and another work, Ushering in Banality—a 
wooden sculpture of two Putto-like figures helping a boy push an 
enormous pig—was found to infringe on a photograph by Barbara 
Campbell.66  Perhaps surprisingly, then, the Koons decisions 
appear not to have dissuaded appropriation artists in their 
activities, though it did make them a little more savvy when it 
came to the law.67  Koons began licensing copyrighted materials 
 
under the fair use doctrine . . . there is simply nothing in the record to support a view that 
Koons produced ‘String of Puppies’ for anything other than sale as high-priced art.”). 
 63 See, e.g., Martha Buskirk, Commodification as Censor: Copyrights and Fair Use, 60 
OCTOBER MIT PRESS 82, 102 (1992) (explaining how Rogers v. Koons “raises a number 
of important and troubling questions about the legal status of artistic appropriation, and it 
may set an important precedent with respect to the appropriation of images in works of 
art. . . . The decision is particularly troubling given the way in which strategies of 
appropriation have often performed a critical function”); Ronald Sullivan, Appeals Court 
Rules Artist Pirated Pictures of Puppies, N.Y. TIMES, April 3, 1992, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/03/nyregion/appeals-court-rules-artist-pirated-picture-
of-puppies.html (stating that the ruling of Rogers v. Koons “would have a chilling effect 
on artistic freedom.”).  
 64 Lynne A. Greenberg, The Art of Appropriation: Puppies, Piracy, and Post-
Modernism, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 32–33 (1992). 
 65 See United Features Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).  
Here, Koons attempted an argument that such characters as Odie, due to their cultural 
pervasiveness, had become “public figures” and had “a factual existence as such” which 
entitled them to more limited copyright protection (Id. at 380), despite Koons’ own claim 
that he was not familiar with the character (See id. at 384). 
 66 See Campbell v. Koons, No. 91 Civ. 6055, 1993 WL 97381, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 
1, 1993) (holding that “Koons’ use of Campbell’s photograph to make ‘Ushering in 
Banality’ was completely unauthorized. . . . [His] infringement was clearly willful.”). 
 67 See E. Kenly Ames, Beyond Rogers v. Koons: A Fair Use Standard for 
Appropriation, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1473, 1485 (1993) (explaining that the “unsettled state 
of law has meant that artists have often faced a significant amount of complaint and 
resistance from the copyright holders of the works they appropriate.  The legal 
uncertainty could clearly work to the artists’ advantage at time”); Laura Gilbert, No 
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for his works, obtaining permission from many copyright holders, 
including United Features Syndicate (which owns the copyright to 
Odie, and who had successfully sued Koons for infringement on 
it).68  But Koons’ new copyright savvy did not keep him out of 
legal hot water. 
In 2000, Koons was commissioned to create a new series of 
seven paintings for the Deutsche Guggenheim Museum in Berlin.69  
Each work in the series dubbed “Easyfun-Ethereal” is essentially 
an oil-painted collage.70  Koons collected images from 
advertisements, scanned them into a computer, and digitally cut-
and-pasted selected, disembodied elements together over a 
landscape background.71  The digital collages were then printed 
and used by Koons’ assistants as templates for the final paintings.72  
One painting in the series, Niagara, consists of images of women’s 
lower legs and feet—two in shoes, two barefoot—dangling above a 
tray of donuts and another of Danishes.73  Behind the feet is an 
image of an enormous brownie topped with ice cream, and behind 
that sits a landscape dominated by the image of Niagara Falls.74  
According to Koons, the final painting was meant to “comment on 
the ways in which some of our most basic appetites—for food, 
 
Longer Appropriate?, THE ART NEWSPAPER, May 9, 2012, available at 
http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/No-longer-appropriate/26378 (explaining that 
“‘appropriating’ other artists’ work without consent is still common, but savvier 
practitioners know that permission is far less painful.”).   
 68 See Gilbert, supra note 67 (explaining that “‘hordes of people’” have granted Koons 
permission to use their copyrighted material, including United Feature Syndicate). 
 69 See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 246–47 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that Koon’s 
Easyfun-Ethereal was commissioned in 2000 by Deutsche Bank and Guggenheim). 
 70 See id. at 247 (explaining that Koons gathered images from various sources to use as 
paint templates for all seven paintings); John Hudson, Easyfun—Ethereal, CULTURE 
WARS (2001), http://www.culturewars.org.uk/2001-08/koons.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 
2013). 
 71 See Blanch, 467 F.3d at 247 (explaining that “Koons culled images from 
advertisements or his own photographs, scanned them into a computer, and digitally 
superimposed the scanned images against backgrounds of pastoral landscapes.”).   
 72 See id. at 247 (describing that Koons “printed color images of the resulting collages 
for his assistants to use as templates for applying paint to billboard-sized . . . 
canvasses.”). 
 73 See id. (explaining that Niagara “depicts four pairs of women’s feet and lower legs 
dangling over . . . a tray of donuts, and a tray of apple Danish pastries”). 
 74 See id. at 247.  
C01_HICK (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2013  3:33 PM 
1166 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 23:1155 
play, and sex—are mediated by popular images.”75  One of the 
pairs of feet—the second pair from the left—was modeled on a 
photograph taken by Andrea Blanch, “Silk Sandals by Gucci.”76  
Blanch’s original photograph showed the woman’s feet resting on 
a man’s lap in an airplane cabin.  For her work, Blanch wanted to 
“show some sort of erotic sense[;] . . . to get . . . more of a 
sexuality to the photographs.”77  For Niagara, Koons reproduced 
only the legs, feet, and shoes from Blanch’s photograph, adding a 
heel to one of the shoes, altering their orientation, and slightly 
modifying the coloring.78  Blanch discovered Koons’ use and filed 
suit.79 
Although again claiming fair use, Koons did not attempt in this 
case to claim that his work was a parody.80  Rather, Koons argued 
that his work was transformative.81  In his seminal 1990 article on 
fair use, Judge Pierre Leval attempted to outline a permanent 
framework upon which fair use cases might be adjudicated.82  
Central to this framework is the notion of transformative use.83  
Suggesting that transformation, which advances knowledge and the 
progress of the arts, can be distinguished from repackaged free 
riding, Leval argued: 
I believe the answer to the question of justification 
turns primarily on whether, and to what extent, the 
challenged use is transformative.  The use must be 
 
 75 Id. (quoting Koons’ Affidavit). 
 76 See id. at 248–49. 
 77 Id. (quoting Blanch’s deposition). 
 78 See id. 
 79 See id. 
 80 See Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 8, Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 
(2d Cir. 2006) (No. 05-6433-CV) (“Koons moved for summary judgment, or in the 
alternative partial summary judgment, on the following grounds: i) any claim based on 
the creation and sale of the painting was barred by the statute of limitations; ii) there was 
no infringement due to a lack of substantial similarity; iii) there was no infringement due 
to the fair use privilege; iv) Blanch’s prayer for an award of punitive damages could not 
be maintained as a matter of law and/or under any known facts.”). 
 81 See id. (arguing that the district court correctly determined that Koons’ use was 
transformational). 
 82 See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105 
(1990). 
 83 See id. at 1111 (“I believe the answer to the question of justification turns primarily 
on whether, and to what extent, the challenged use is transformative.”). 
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productive and must employ the quoted matter in a 
different manner or for a different purpose from the 
original. . . . If . . . the secondary use adds value to 
the original—if the quoted matter is used as raw 
material, transformed in the creation of new 
information, new aesthetics, new insights and 
understandings—this is the very type of activity that 
the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the 
enrichment of society. . . . If a quotation of 
copyrighted material reveals no transformative 
purpose, fair use should perhaps be rejected without 
further inquiry into the other factors.  Factor One is 
the soul of fair use.84 
Judge Leval’s analysis served as the philosophical basis to the 
landmark Supreme Court decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, four 
years later.85  Here, drawing on Leval’s framework and the legal 
origin for fair use, Folsom v. Marsh, Justice Souter wrote: 
The central purpose of this investigation is to see, in 
Justice Story’s words, whether the new work merely 
“supersede[s] the objects” of the original 
creation, (“supplanting” the original), or instead 
adds something new, with a further purpose or 
different character, altering the first with new 
expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other 
words, whether and to what extent the new work is 
“transformative.”  Although such transformative use 
is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair 
use, the goal of copyright, to promote science and 
the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of 
transformative works.  Such works thus lie at the 
heart of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of 
breathing space within the confines of copyright, 
and the more transformative the new work, the less 
will be the significance of other factors, like 
 
 84 Id. at 1111, 1116.  Here, Leval contrasts the first factor of fair use with the Supreme 
Court’s earlier claim that the fourth factor was “the single most important element of fair 
use.” Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). 
 85 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (quoting Leval, supra note 82, at 1111.). 
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commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of 
fair use.86 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose in many ways established the basis for 
parody claims under fair use, and as a result conceptually tied up 
issues of transformation with issues of parody.87  In Blanch v. 
Koons, however, the court returned to the core of Leval’s theory 
and separated the issues of parody and transformation, focusing 
solely on the latter.88  The court noted, “[t]he sharply different 
objectives that Koons had in using, and Blanch had in creating, 
‘Silk Sandals’ confirms the transformative nature of the use.”89  
Given the “distinct creative or communicative objectives”90 of 
Koons and Blanch, respectively, the court decided Koons’ use was 
transformative regardless of whether Niagara commented critically 
in any substantive way on Blanch’s original photograph: 
“‘Niagara’ . . . may be better characterized for these purposes as 
satire—its message appears to target the genre of which ‘Silk 
Sandals’ is typical, rather than the individual photograph itself.”91  
Although the work was not found to be parodic, the transformative 
nature of Koons’ painting was found to weigh the first factor of 
fair use in its favor and trickled through the remaining factors in 
much the same way that they would in a parody case.92  On this 
basis, the court of appeals affirmed an earlier district court decision 
that Koons’ use was fair.93 
The death knell of appropriation art had, it seemed, had been 
rung prematurely.  Where the cases surrounding Koons’ “Banality 
Show” had seemed to put the kibosh on unauthorized appropriation 
art, the finding in Blanch v. Koons gave new hope to appropriation 
 
 86 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 87 See id. (finding that “parody has an obvious claim to transformative value”). 
 88 See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing transformative 
use). 
 89 Id. at 252.  The court also draws on Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley 
Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006) in which reproduced images of Grateful Dead concert 
posters and tickets were found sufficiently transformative and ultimately fair when used 
in a biography of the rock band. 
 90 Blanch, 467 F.3d at 253. 
 91 Id. at 254. 
 92 See id. at 253 (concluding that the use in question was transformative). 
 93 Id. at 259. 
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artists.94  And so, when Richard Prince was sued for copyright 
infringement only a couple of years later, he had reason to be 
optimistic. 
Prince had become known for photographing others’ 
photographs—particularly images used in commercial 
advertising—and presenting the results as his own work.95  In 
2005, one of Prince’s “re-photographs” set an auction record, 
selling for over $1 million.96  When Prince was sued, however, it 
was (as with Koon’s Niagara) for a collage, and not for a 
straightforward re-photograph.97  The case in question centered on 
Prince’s work, Canal Zone (2007), a collage consisting of thirty-
five photographs from Yes, Rasta, a book of photographs by 
Patrick Cariou depicting Jamaican Rastafarians.  Prince had torn 
out the photographs and pasted them onto a wooden board.98  
Prince used some of Cariou’s photographs in their entirety, 
cropped others, and painted ovoid splotches over some of the faces 
depicted.99  The work was one of thirty created for the series 
“Canal Zone,” all but one of which employ images from Yes, 
Rasta.100  Motivated by a gallery’s cancellation of a planned show 
of his work,101 Cariou filed for summary judgment.102  Prince 
attempted to argue—as Koons had successfully—that his 
 
 94 See id. at, 264 (stating that where the court found “stronger considerations” existed 
[in] “pointing toward a finding of fair use.”). 
 95 See GRANT B. ROMER, THE GETTY INSTITUTE, WHAT WAS PHOTOGRAPHY? 3 (2010) 
(“[H]e has explained his ‘appropriation art’, which has made him famous.  In the early 
1980’s he began re-photographing advertisements featuring cowboys while working for 
Time-Life in the tear-sheet department.”). 
 96 See id. at 2 (“On November 8th, 2005, Richard Prince’s Untitled (Cowboy) 1989, 
set a world auction record, the first photograph to publicly sell for over a million 
dollars…The ‘re-photograph’ of a magazine Marlboro cigarette advertisement, sold at 
Christie’s Post-War/Contemporary Art auction for $1,248,000.”).  
 97 Cariou v. Prince, 784 F.Supp.2d 337, 343 (S.D.N.Y 2011); Cariou v. Prince, No. 
11-1197-cv (2d Cir. Apr. 25, 2013). 
 98 Id. 
 99 See id. 
 100 See id. at 344. 
 101 See id. (The show was “[c]ancelled by the gallery owner due to fears that she would 
seem to be capitalizing on Prince’s success and notoriety, and worries about exhibiting 
work that had been ‘done already’.”)., 
 102 See id. at 337 (“Defendants invite this Court to find that use of copyrighted materials 
as raw materials in creating ‘appropriation art’ which does not comment on the 
copyrighted original is a fair use.”). 
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appropriation art was transformative and, on this basis, fair use.103  
The district court, however, stated that it was “aware of no 
precedent holding that such use is fair absent transformative 
comment on the original.”104  Rather, it interpreted the finding of 
Koons’ Niagara as transformative of Blanch’s photograph because 
Koons “used it to comment on the role such advertisements play in 
our culture and on the attitudes the original and other 
advertisements like it promote.”105  Comparatively, the court found 
that Prince’s appropriation was not in service of any 
commentary—either with regard to Cariou’s works, or to the 
broader culture of which they are a part.106  Where Koons and 
Blanch had clearly distinct artistic aims, the court in Cariou v. 
Prince found that Prince’s purpose was essentially the same as 
Cariou’s: “a desire to communicate to the viewer core truths about 
Rastafarians and their culture.”107  That is, while Prince intended 
that his work be something new, “his intent was not transformative 
within the meaning of Section 107.”108 And so the pendulum 
seemed to have swung back in the other direction for appropriation 
art. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision 
in part, finding that twenty-five of Prince’s offending works were 
in fact fair.  The remaining five works were remanded to the 
district court to reconsider on the basis that the court of appeals set 
out. Citing the reasoning in Blanch, the court of appeals argues 
that, to be transformative, it is not necessary that a use comment on 
the original—or, indeed, on anything else.109  Dismissing Prince’s 
own stated intentions regarding his works as essentially irrelevant, 
the court contends, “Prince’s works could be transformative even 
without commenting on Cariou’s work or on culture, and even 
without Prince’s stated intention to do so.”110  Instead, the court 
 
 103 See id. at 348. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 See id. at 349 (“Prince did not intend to comment on any aspects of the original 
works or on the broader culture.”). 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
109  Cariou v. Prince, No. 11-1197-cv (2d Cir. Apr. 25, 2013). 
110  Id. 
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suggests, the central question is whether the new work is 
transformative in the sense of adding “something new, with a 
further purpose or different character, altering the first with new 
expression, meaning, or message.”111  And transformation in this 
sense, the court argues, hangs on “how the artworks may 
‘reasonably be perceived’.”112  The assumption here is that whether 
a work is a new expression, has a new message, or is invested with 
new meaning, is something that the work will wear on its face: 
“Here, looking at the artworks and the photographs side-by-side, 
we conclude that Prince’s images . . . have a different character, 
give Cariou’s photographs a new expression, and employ new 
aesthetics with creative and communicative results distinct from 
Cariou’s.”113 
And so the pendulum swings once again. 
III. SOME STRATEGIES 
A number of strategies have been suggested for how copyright 
law—and, in particular, fair use—might accommodate 
appropriation art.  Perhaps the first such theorist, Patricia Krieg, 
suggested that appropriation art constitutes a special form of 
political discourse—acting as a “political symbol”114—and, 
“[b]ecause political discourse lies at the very core of First 
Amendment concerns, these images deserve the status of protected 
speech.”115  Krieg elaborates: 
Courts should extend First Amendment protection 
to visual works which use appropriated images to 
convey original expression, as this is consistent with 
First Amendment guarantees of free artistic 
expression.  If the art work has significantly altered 
or transformed the copyrighted material so that the 
work as a whole adds meaning beyond that 
 
111  Id. 
112  Id. 
113  Id. 
 114 Patricia Krieg, Copyright, Free Speech, and the Visual Arts, 93 YALE L.J. 1565, 
1578 (1984). 
 115 Id. 
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conveyed by the context of the copyrighted image 
alone, First Amendment protection is warranted.116 
Krieg was writing several years before the finding of Rogers v. 
Koons, and indeed several years before Judge Leval’s oft-quoted 
paper, but her focus on transformation clearly predicts Leval’s 
framework.117  Unfortunately, Krieg wraps up transformation in 
the issue of free speech.  Only a year after Krieg’s essay was 
published, the Supreme Court determined that the limits of 
copyright—including the confines of fair use—are consistent with 
First Amendment protections.118  In other words, the First 
Amendment cannot serve as a viable defense against complaints of 
infringement.119 
Also writing before the Koons cases, but at a time when 
appropriation art seemed to be circling closer and closer to the 
courts, John Carlin suggested modifying existing fair use standards 
to better allow for appropriation art.120  Rejecting the standard 
four-factor model, Carlin focuses on the purpose of the copying 
 
 116 Id. at 1584. 
 117 Compare id. (“If the art work has significantly altered or transformed the 
copyrighted material so that the work as a whole adds meaning beyond that conveyed by 
the context of the copyrighted image alone, First Amendment protection is warranted.”) 
with Leval, supra note 82, at 1111 (“I believe  the  answer  to  the question  of 
justification  turns primarily on  whether, and  to  what  extent, the  challenged  use  is  
transformative.”). 
 118 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560, 582 
(1985); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft 537 U.S. 186, 218–21 (2003) (discussing that the 
proximity in the time of the adoption of both the Copyright Clause and First Amendment 
indicates that, in the Framers’ view, copyright’s limited monopolies are compatible with 
free speech principles). 
 119 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560.  According to the Court’s view, “the First 
Amendment protections already embodied in the Copyright Act’s distinction between 
copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for 
scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use, we see no warrant for 
expanding the doctrine of fair use to create what amounts to a public figure exception to 
copyright.”  Thus, the Court adds “whether verbatim copying from a public figure’s 
manuscript in a given case is or is not fair must be judged according to the traditional 
equities of fair use.”  This explanation establishes that raising an additional defense in an 
inquiry involving fairness would not proceed and must be address under fair use.  
 120 See Carlin, supra note 27, at 138 (explaining that in some situations flexibility of 
fair use should be modify to allow innovative artistic expression). 
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and the nature of the work copied.121  Carlin suggests, first, that an 
appropriation artist’s commercial interests should not determine a 
finding of fair use, but rather that the question hangs on “whether 
or not there is willful interference with another’s commercial 
interests.”122  Second, Carlin looks to whether the image copied is 
a part of a shared cultural vocabulary—whether the particular 
image appropriated is recognizable to the average viewer.123  
Third, Carlin would require that, for an appropriation to be deemed 
fair, the artist behind the original work be no longer living, or at 
least no longer actively exhibiting his work.124  Finally, Carlin 
suggests that singular works of appropriation be deemed 
presumptively fair, while works of appropriation in multiple copies 
be subject to further investigation.125 
Carlin’s approach, while extremely interesting, runs into some 
problems.  In general, Carlin’s suggested framework seems jerry-
built to handle the particular cases of appropriation that he has in 
mind, leaving little room for other forms of art appropriation.126  
As E. Kenly Ames notes, Koons’ String of Puppies, though not a 
willful interference with Rogers’ commercial interests, would 
likely not have fared well under Carlin’s system: first, the image 
probably would not have been immediately recognizable to an 
average viewer; second, Rogers was at the time of Koons’ 
appropriation still a working artist; and third, Koons created four 
editions of his sculpture.127  Koons’ other works, as well as 
Prince’s Canal Zone, would seem to encounter similar problems 
 
 121 See id. at 138–39 (“This is done to distinguish purely commercial appropriation 
from that having artistic legitimacy.”). 
 122 Id. at 139. 
 123 See id. 
 124 See id. 
 125 See id. at 129–30, 135–36. 
 126 See Ames, supra note 67, at 1514 (“Appropriation of an unknown work is no more 
likely to have a detrimental effect on the original artist’s incentive to create than is 
appropriation of a well-known work.  To draw this boundary as Carlin does is to chill 
expression in the same manner, although admittedly not to the same degree, as the current 
fair use doctrine does.”). 
 127 See id. at 1513.  Ames further suggests that Carlin’s system “arbitrarily privileges 
the work of established artists over that of fledgling artists.” Id.  This, however, seems 
questionable. 
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under Carlin’s framework.128  Granted, Carlin did not have the 
advantage of such legal hindsight, but with these cases in mind, it 
seems his system offers no greater advantage to appropriation 
artists, and is no less convoluted, than the existing system.129 
Like Carlin, Ames seeks a specialized approach to fair use for 
cases of artistic appropriation.130  Writing after Rogers but before 
Blanch, Ames seeks to distinguish appropriation art from parody, 
noting a particular disparity between what she sees as their 
respective functions, but establishing an approach which parallels 
the traditional approach to parody under fair use and in many ways 
predicting the outcome in Blanch.131  First, looking to the purpose 
and character of use, Ames suggests that for a work of 
appropriation art to be presumptively fair, it should be a work of 
visual art, as defined under the Visual Artists’ Rights Act of 
1990.132  Second, Ames suggests that, to be fair, “an artist’s use of 
an appropriated image in a work of visual art should create a 
presumption that the work is created for the purpose of social 
criticism or commentary.”133  Regarding the nature of the work 
copied, Ames, unlike Carlin, does not limit the sources for 
appropriation to well-known images.134  Rather, Ames allows for 
appropriation of “existing images that are representative of a 
particular type of genre of popular expression,” where “the 
reasonable observer would recognize the image as being of a 
 
 128 Though Wild Boy and Puppy would have had the advantage of including a 
recognizable character of popular culture, and Niagara and Canal Zone exist in only 
single copies. 
 129 See Ames, supra note 67, at 1513 
 130 See id. at 1518. 
 131 See id. (“Existing fair use doctrine was designed, and is adequate, to handle all but 
the most extreme subset of derivative uses.  It was not, however, designed to handle the 
very limited number of uses for which partial copying of the original work is not a viable 
option and in which the relationship between appropriator and copyright holder is as 
likely to be adversarial as that between parodist and copyright holder.”). 
 132 See id. at 1518–19.  This restriction is suggested by Ames for two reasons: 1) to 
“ensure that a copyright holder’s image will not turn up on mass-produced and mass-
marketed consumer goods, about whose critical purpose one would be quite skeptical; 
and 2) to avoid any need to decide whether it is “good art,” or even “art” at all, or 
whether it is successful in getting its critical message across to the viewer.” Id. 
 133 Id. at 1519. 
 134 See id. at 1514. 
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particular type or genre of images.”135  Noting that the secondary 
artist may need to appropriate an entire visual work in order to 
convey her critical message, Ames suggests no limit to the amount 
of the original copied, and further suggests that the secondary artist 
not be required to directly criticize the work copied: “The ability to 
criticize and comment on the values and practices of society on a 
sweeping scale is the special attribute of appropriation.”136  
Finally, regarding the effect on the potential market for the original 
work, Ames suggests that such appropriation should be deemed 
fair so long as the secondary work cannot reasonably function as a 
market substitute for the original.137 
Roxana Badin offers an approach that is largely in line with 
Ames’, particularly as regards the issue of social commentary, 
which both take to be central to the project of appropriation art.138  
In general, Badin suggests that appropriation art performs a 
communicative function, leading to the public benefit of a “more 
direct relationship between the creative arts and popular culture, 
inevitably increasing the public’s exposure to the arts.”139  
Focusing on cases in which artists appropriate common, 
recognizable objects and imagery of popular culture (“soup cans, 
flags, cigarette packages, money, movie stars, comic strips and 
even shopping bags”140), Badin recommends a notion of 
“transformative use” expanded to recognize the “allegorical 
strategy” of appropriation art and so to allow for their fair use.141  
By “allegorical strategy,” Badin is referring to the 
recontextualization of recognizable images by artists so as to invest 
those images with new meaning.142  In the case of appropriation 
art, Badin suggests this new meaning takes the form of social 
 
 135 Id. at 1521. 
 136 Id. at 1522. 
 137 See id. at 1524–25. 
 138 See Badin, supra note 53, at 1654–56 (1995) (explaining that the “creative 
significance of all forms of appropriation . . . derives from its ability to speak critically of 
the society in which both the public and the artist live.”). 
 139 See id. at 1655. 
 140 Id. at 1656. 
 141 See id. at 1684. 
 142 See id. at 1668. 
C01_HICK (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2013  3:33 PM 
1176 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 23:1155 
commentary.143  The image gains new meaning, Badin argues, by 
forcing the viewer to reevaluate her understanding of the image.144  
It is this reorientation of our evaluative practices, she suggests, that 
makes all art—and not merely appropriation art—valuable.145  
Badin further contends that “[p]ostmodern artists deliberately 
abstain from altering the appropriated symbol or adding stylistic 
marks that would identify the artist’s authorship in the piece 
because, by principle, the symbol’s own vocabulary is the means 
by which the artist conveys the allegorical message,”146 treating 
images of popular culture as “parables of conspicuous 
consumption.”147 
Both Ames and Badin provide interesting analyses and offer 
interesting strategies, but both err in applying a universal 
philosophy to appropriation art, using this as the foundation upon 
which to accommodate appropriation art within copyright law. 
IV. THE AIMS OF APPROPRIATION ART 
Appropriation—the taking from artistic and other sources—for 
a new work is, as many will tell you, nearly as old as art itself.148  
Some artists have employed such takings to build on previous 
works, many to study those works, others to comment on them, 
and some simply to steal.149  But Shakespeare, though he took 
many of his plots from other sources,150 cannot reasonably be 
called an “appropriation artist” in the sense that Koons and Prince 
are so called.  Nor does it seem reasonable to label Vincent van 
Gogh an appropriation artist in the relevant sense, though he 
copied and adapted nearly two dozen works by Jean-Francois 
 
 143 See id. at 1687.  
 144 See id. at 1660.   
 145 See id. at 1660. 
 146 Id. at 1661. 
 147 Id. at 1660. 
 148 See id. at 1657.  
 149 See Willajeanne F. McLean, All’s Not Fair in Art and War: A Look at the Fair Use 
Defense After Rogers v. Koons, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 373, 385 (1993). 
 150 See Badin, supra note 53, at 1654 n.5 
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Millet into paintings in his own inimitable style.151  Pablo Picasso 
reinterpreted (and, in a sense, recreated) Velasquez’ Las Meninas 
(1656) in a series of 58 paintings,152 but it would be similarly 
difficult to call Picasso an appropriation artist.  Although each of 
these artists has appropriated in one sense or another, if we are to 
talk about the contemporary art-historical category of 
appropriation art, we cannot simply reduce it to appropriation—
taking—as an artistic method. 
Neither, however, can we describe the contemporary category 
of appropriation art on the basis that it is essentially a form of 
social commentary.  Ames contends that “[w]hile societal criticism 
is usually incidental to traditional parody, it is the avowed purpose 
of appropriationist visual art.”153  Badin’s view is even narrower: 
“Appropriation in contemporary art has been defined as an 
allegorical process through which the artist uses symbols of 
popular culture as parables of conspicuous consumption.”154  
Certainly, this seems true of much of Koons’ work, but it does not 
describe Koons’ appropriationist work in its entirety, and it 
certainly does not describe the contemporary category of 
appropriation art as a whole.155  Probably the most celebrated of 
the appropriation artists is Sherrie Levine, who only very rarely 
appropriates from popular culture sources.  Instead, Levine 
appropriates from other artists, such as Walker Evans, Alfred 
Stieglitz, and Kasimir Malevich.156  Sturtevant, who set the 
contemporary movement in motion, appropriated from her artistic 
 
 151 See Michael J. Madison, Beyond Creativity: Copyright As Knowledge Law, 12 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 817, 837 (2010). 
 152 See HANS BELTING, THE INVISIBLE MASTERPIECE 357 (Helen Atkins, trans., Reaktion 
Books 2001 (1998). 
 153 Ames, supra note 67, at 1500. 
 154 Badin, supra note 53, at 1660.  Here, Badin cites Benjamin H.D. Buchloh, 
Allegorical Procedures: Appropriation and Montage in Contemporary Art, 21 
ARTFORUM 43, 46 (1981), though it is worth noting that Buchloh does not actually give 
this as a definition. 
 155 See Greenberg, supra note 64, at 31. 
 156 See Sherri Levine, GUGGENHEIM, http://www.guggenheim.org/new-
york/collections/collection-online/show-full/bio/?artist_name=Sherrie%20Levine (last 
visited Feb. 1, 2013) (“Levine extended her strategy of appropriation . . . when she 
rephotographed works by famous photographers including . . . Walker Evans.”). 
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contemporaries.157  Neither Levine nor Sturtevant seems centrally 
interested in popular culture, “conspicuous consumption,” or the 
sort of societal criticism Ames discusses.  And, in the case of 
Canal Zone at least, Prince “did not intend to comment on any 
aspects of the original works or on the broader culture.”158 
If we were to attempt to describe the contemporary movement 
of appropriation art in broad strokes, I would suggest that what 
links these artists is the employment of appropriation in pursuit of 
artistic projects focused on the art object—the nature of the thing 
(in both the original and secondary works)—and the nature of 
authorship.  In many ways, appropriation art is about 
appropriation: the viewer is meant to know that the objects and 
images presented are appropriated, and this is meant to say 
something about the objects and the authorship of the original and 
new works.  Lynne A. Greenberg suggests, “[t]hese artists likewise 
strive to erase all authorship from their work, replacing individual 
signature with the trademarks of mass-produced commodities.  In 
so doing, they radically deny the notion of ‘creative authorship’ as 
a principle and as a definitional codification for works of art.”159  
While this is true of, say, Levine,160 Sturtevant considered her 
works “original Sturtevants” while openly acknowledging their 
sources.161  Prince’s general strategy is, if anything, the opposite of 
Levine’s.  Where Levine makes her sources explicit in the titles of 
her works, Prince treats his sources as authorless and himself as 
the author.162  Speaking of his re-photographs of magazine 
advertisements, Prince says: 
 
 157 See Irvin, supra note 20, at 123. 
 158 Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 349 (SDNY 2011). 
 159 Greenberg, supra note 64, at 6; see also Carlin, supra note 24, at 129 n.106. 
(“Appropriation transcends parody because it is a well-grounded and conscious attack on 
traditional notions of originality and authorship in art.  Appropriation is one of the most 
important conceptual strategies in late twentieth-century art because it underscores the 
role of the artist as the manipulator or modifier of existing material, rather than as the 
inventor or creator of new forms.”). 
 160 See Irvin, supra note 20, at 123–24. 
 161 Elisa Schaar, Spinoza in Vegas, Sturtevant Everywhere: A Case of Critical (Re-) 
Discoveries and Artistic Self-Reinventions, 33 ART HISTORY 886, 890 (2010). 
 162 See Brian Appel, Richard Prince, ROVE TV (2007), available at 
http://www.rovetv.net/pr-interview.html.  
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I like to think about making it again instead of 
making it new . . . Advertising images aren’t really 
associated with an author—more with a 
product/company and for the most part put out or 
“art directed.”  They kind of end up having a life of 
their own.  It’s not like you’re taking them from 
anyone.  Pages in a magazine are more often 
thought of as “collage.”  When I re-photographed 
these pages they became “real” photographs.163 
In another interview, Prince elaborates: 
They were like these authorless pictures, too good 
to be true, art-directed and over-determined and 
pretty-much like film stills, psychologically hyped-
up and having nothing to do with the way art 
pictures were traditionally “put” together.  I mean 
they were so off the map, so hard to look at, and 
rather than tear them out of the magazines and paste 
them up on a board, I thought why not re-
photograph them with a camera and then put them 
in a real frame with a mat board around the picture 
just like a real photograph and call them mine.164 
Prince revels in his authorship while denying it to the art from 
which he appropriates.165 
It is at best difficult to attempt to draw lines to clearly 
distinguish one artistic movement from all others, and it would be 
equally difficult to fully and clearly explain any given artistic 
project or artist’s body of work.  Nevertheless, Sturtevant, Levine, 
Koons, and Prince—despite differences in their respective goals 
and views—are involved in substantially similar projects, projects 
unlike those of Shakespeare, Van Gogh, and Picasso.166  However, 
the lines that separate appropriation art from other movements are 
 
 163 Id.  
 164 Jeff Rian, In the Picture: Jeff Rian in Conversation with Richard Prince, in 
RICHARD PRINCE 6, 12 (2003). 
 165  See id.; Appel, supra note 162.  
 166  See KENNETH GOLDSMITH, UNCREATIVE WRITING 109–18 (2011); MARJORIE 
PERLOFF, UNORIGINAL GENIUS: POETRY BY OTHER MEANS IN THE NEW CENTURY 146–50 
(2010). 
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certainly blurry.  Does Duchamp’s L.H.O.O.Q. (1919)—a postcard 
of the Mona Lisa upon which Duchamp penciled a moustache and 
goatee—qualify as appropriation art?  Roy Lichtenstein’s 
enormous Pop-Art reproductions of comic-book panels certainly 
seem to come close.  And what of Walter Benjamin’s The Arcades 
Project (1940)—a 1,000-page literary collage—or Kenneth 
Goldsmith’s Day (2003), a word-for-word retyping of the 
September 1, 2000 issue of the New York Times?  Ames restricts 
her analysis—and, indeed, membership in the category of 
appropriation art—to the visual arts, but there seems to be a clear 
fraternity with these “conceptual writers,” as they have been 
dubbed.167  Like Koons and Prince, they trace their conceptual 
origins to Duchamp and Barthes, and focus on the art object and 
the nature of authorship.  Their projects are very much about 
appropriation. 
V. APPROPRIATION AND TRANSFORMATION 
As noted above, the court in Rogers v. Koons states, “[i]f an 
infringer of copyrightable expression could be justified as fair use 
solely on the basis of the infringer’s claim to a higher or different 
artistic use—without insuring public awareness of the original 
work—there would be no practicable boundary to the fair use 
defense.”168  This is, on its face, a compelling slippery-slope 
argument: without any such boundary, what wouldn’t be allowable 
as fair use?  Impressed by this argument, the district court in 
Cariou sought a principled break to keep copyright from sliding 
into oblivion.169 
The court states that Prince’s “intent was not transformative 
within the meaning of Section 107.”170  This was an odd choice of 
words, however, given that transformation is not once mentioned 
in § 107 of the Copyright Act (the section devoted to the fair use 
doctrine).171  Indeed, the notion of transformation is raised only 
 
 167 See GOLDSMITH, supra note 166, at 109–18; PERLOFF, supra note 166, at 146–50. 
 168 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 169 See Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 170 Id.  
 171 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
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once in the whole of the Act: in § 101, in the definition of 
“derivative work.”172  And so it is perhaps even odder still that the 
court drew this particular line in the sand: “Prince’s Paintings are 
transformative only to the extent that they comment on [Cariou’s] 
Photos; to the extent they merely recast, transform, or adapt the 
Photos, Prince’s Paintings are instead infringing derivative 
works.”173  The court as such appears to be making a distinction 
between “mere transformation” (with regard to derivative works) 
and a special sort of transformation-as-commentary (in the domain 
of fair use).174  Although this does draw a principled break on the 
slippery slope, the distinction employs a rather strange use of 
“transformative.”  While it is at the courts’ discretion to introduce 
terms of law with specialized meanings in the legal domain, this is 
certainly not how “transformative” is used by Leval nor by the 
court in Blanch v. Koons, nor does it seem an intuitive use of the 
term.175  Rather, it appears to be an ad hoc definition solely 
invented by the court in Cariou to stop the slide towards copyright 
anarchy.176 
The appeals court, too, found this reasoning flawed, and 
introduced instead a stance on transformation disconnected from 
matters of intent. The court suggests, “[w]hat is critical is how the 
work in question appears to the reasonable observer, not simply 
what an artist might say about a particular piece or body of 
work.”177  However, the suggestion that transformativeness lies in 
“how the artworks may ‘reasonably be perceived’”178 is more 
complicated than it may at first appear. As the court notes, the 
audience for Prince’s work is very different from that of 
 
 172 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or more 
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, 
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, 
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.  
A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications, 
which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a ‘derivative work.’”).  
 173 Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 349.  
 174 See id.  
 175 Compare id., with Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992), and Leval, 
supra note 82.  
 176 Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 349. 
177  Cariou v. Prince, No. 11-1197-cv (2d Cir. Apr. 25, 2013). 
178  Id. 
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Cariou’s.179 And when the court reduces the question of 
transformation to how the work would appear to a “reasonable 
observer,” it fails to ask whether this observer is a member of 
Prince’s audience, or of Cariou’s, both, or neither.  Even where the 
original and the secondary work appear visually indistinguishable, 
the audience familiar with the aims and practices of appropriation 
art will treat them very differently, and in many cases, they are 
likely to find something new—a new meaning, a fundamentally 
different aesthetic.  And much of this will turn precisely on what 
the artist says about his work.  
In the end, the court leaves open what qualifies as a “new 
expression” or the employment of “new aesthetics,” instead 
passing that burden on to an abstract “reasonable observer,” and 
so, rather than providing a solution to the problem, only pushes the 
problem back a level. 
Exactly what constitutes “transformation” in the law remains 
an open question.  On the understanding that appearance alone 
cannot do the job, Ames and Badin attempt to ground 
transformation in context.  Ames asserts, “What makes an image 
unique—what a reproduction cannot capture—is the context of the 
image.  Meaning is dependent on context.”180  Badin elaborates: 
By placing a universal object such as Duchamp’s 
Ready-made in the context of a gallery, the artist 
simultaneously appropriates a sign’s already laden 
popular significance and reinvests new meaning in 
the object as testament to the vices or virtues of 
modern society.  Shifting the context of the image 
in this way transforms the meaning of the original 
image by forcing the viewer to reevaluate his or her 
former, most often unconscious, understanding of 
the image.181 
Change in context, on this view, brings about a change in 
meaning—a transformation in the work.  Context alone, however, 
does not change a work, though a change in context might alter its 
 
179  Id. (“Prince’s audience is very different from Cariou’s”) 
 180 Ames, supra note 67, at 1481. 
 181 Badin, supra note 53, at 1660. 
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significance to us.  Taking a tribal African mask and placing it in 
an art gallery alongside primitivist works by Matisse and Picasso 
might alter how we look at or think about the mask, but it does not 
change the work (nor does it change those by Matisse and Picasso).  
Whatever was intrinsically true of the mask before its change in 
context remains true after, and whatever was false remains false.182  
We might be more aware of the work’s subtle lines, or of the 
relation it bears to contemporary Western art, but if these are 
properties of the mask, they were properties of the mask before we 
discovered them.  If it were true that context alone changed a work, 
then moving a sculpture from one room to another would result in 
a new or altered sculpture, and this surely isn’t the case. 
That being said, something happens when Duchamp selects a 
urinal and makes it art, when a collagist combines preexisting 
images together, or when Levine re-photographs an image created 
by Walker Evans and presents it as a new work.  This is not simply 
a matter of context, however.  Rather, the artist (Duchamp, the 
collagist, or Levine) employs the preexisting object as a means of 
expressing some new and distinct idea. 
Copyright protects expressions, and not the ideas expressed.183  
However, expressions and ideas are not so neatly divisible as the 
law would sometimes like to pretend.  If we take an idea to be, 
roughly, the content of a thought, feeling, emotion, desire, and/or 
other cognitive state or event, and an expression to be the 
manifestation or embodiment of such an idea or ideas in a 
perceptible form, then ‘expression’ will always be an ellipsis for 
“expression-of-an-idea” or “expression-of-ideas.”184  There are no 
bare expressions—expressions that do not express ideas; such a 
 
 182 Of course, its relational properties may be so altered.  It is now true of the mask that 
it sits beside a Picasso sculpture, where this was false of it before. 
 183 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original 
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, 
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, 
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work”).  See generally Baker v. Selden, 101 
U.S. 99 (1879) (originally giving rise to the idea/expression dichotomy, today encoded in 
the Copyright Act of 1976).  
 184 See Darren Hudson Hick, Making Sense of the Copyrightability of Plots: A Case 
Study in the Ontology of Art, 67 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 399, 402 (2009).  Under 
“ideas,” here, I would include ideas about facts. 
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thing simply is not an expression, whatever it may be.  And so, any 
expression will be indexical to its idea, though a given idea might 
be expressed in multiple ways.185  Likewise, the same image, 
textual string, or series of notes may be used to express entirely 
disparate ideas.186  As such, if two expressions, however 
indistinguishable, express two distinct ideas, they are (perhaps all 
appearances to the contrary) two distinct expressions, strictly 
speaking.  And, just as I might imbue an ordinary urinal with an 
idea by transforming it into art (through perhaps little more than 
intending it to be treated as art),187 so too can I use another’s 
image, textual string, or series of notes to express some new idea 
of mine, thereby shedding or adding to the ideas expressed in the 
image, text, or notes by the original author.  Strictly speaking, 
these will be distinct expressions, even if visually, textually, or 
sonically indistinguishable.188 
Of course, if the original image, text, or musical work is 
copyrighted, and I use that image, text, or other work without 
 
 185 See Richard H. Jones, The Myth of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright 
Law, 10 PACE L. REV. 551, 553 (1990).  
 186 This, allowing for possible exceptions where an idea is expressible in only one way. 
In the parlance of copyright law, this idea and its expression will have “merged.” See 
Baker, 101 U.S. at 106 (holding that if an idea can only be expressed in one or a small 
number of ways, copyright law will not protect the expression because it has “merged” 
with the idea); Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 679 (1st Cir. 1967) 
(establishing the principle that where a work is so simple and so straightforward as to 
leave available only a limited number of forms of expression of the substance of the 
subject matter, the expression would be uncopyrightable); Nichols v. Universal Pictures 
Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) (as long as a defendant only takes the uncopyrightable 
elements of a plaintiff’s work, the two works will not be substantially similar enough to 
constitute copyright infringement). 
 187 See generally Jerrold Levinson, Defining Art Historically, 19 BRIT. J. OF AESTHETICS 
232 (1979) (arguing that a thing is art in virtue of its creator’s intention that it be treated 
or regarded as past works were treated or regarded); GEORGE DICKIE, THE ART CIRCLE: A 
THEORY OF ART (1984) (suggesting that an item becomes art in virtue of its role in a 
wider institution of art). 
 188 As the law recognizes that two authors might independently and coincidentally 
string together the same words in the same order, and so treats these as two distinct and 
copyrightable expressions under the law—each being “original” to its author—my theory 
here is less strange than it may initially appear. See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine 
Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951) (“The ‘author’ is entitled to a copyright if he 
independently contrived a work completely identical with what went before; similarly, 
although he obtains a valid copyright, he has no right to prevent another from publishing 
a work identical with his, if not copied from his.”). 
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permission, the result will be a case of prima facie copyright 
infringement.189  That is, although my creation will be a distinct 
expression from that work from which I have appropriated—even 
if it is visually, textually, or sonically indistinguishable from it—
this alone will not shield me from a claim of infringement, nor will 
it guarantee that my creation is copyrightable.190  In the relatively 
simple case in which I have, for instance, photographed someone 
else’s photograph (as Levine and Prince have done on numerous 
occasions), then everything in my resulting work owes its origin to 
the original photographer.  Since nothing in the expression is 
original to me, the work will not pass the minimum bar of 
originality required for copyrightability.191  As far as the law is 
concerned, my photograph will simply be an instance of the 
original work.192  Nevertheless, if I am employing the image in 
service of expressing some distinct idea, it will be, strictly 
speaking, a distinct expression.  Without formally altering the 
original, I will nevertheless have transformed it.  Of course, I 
might also express some new idea by borrowing from a preexisting 
work and formally modifying it in the process.193  Where my 
creation would constitute a new work, insofar as it involves a 
recasting, transformation, or adaptation of an existing copyrighted 
work, it will also be a derivative work and so (if created without 
permission of the original copyright holder) a prima facie violation 
of the derivative works right.194  To recall: 
 
 189 See 17 U.S.C. § 1309 (2006) (establishing originality as an element of the prima 
facie case for copyright infringement).  
 190 See id. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in 
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or 
later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”). 
 191 See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 US 53, 58 (1884) (stating that the 
Constitution covers works as long as they are representations of “original intellectual 
conceptions of the author”); see also Darren Hudson Hick, Toward an Ontology of 
Authored Works, 51 BRIT. J. OF AESTHETICS 185, 195 (2011). 
 192 See Hick, supra note 191, at 194. 
 193 See id. at 192. 
 194 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (among the six exclusive rights recognized in the 
copyright owner is the right “to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted 
work”).  
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A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or 
more preexisting works, such as a translation, 
musical arrangement, dramatization, 
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound 
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, 
condensation, or any other form in which a work 
may be recast, transformed, or adapted.  A work 
consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, 
elaborations, or other modifications, which, as a 
whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a 
“derivative work.”195 
This returns us, then, to the central clash between 
transformative derivative works and transformation as the basis of 
fair use claims.  It is certainly odd that one aspect of copyright law 
(the derivative works right) takes transformation to be sufficient 
for a finding of infringement, while another aspect of the law (the 
fair use doctrine) takes transformation as a core ingredient in 
nullifying such a charge.196  What does transformation mean in the 
context of derivative works?  Not surprisingly, there is 
disagreement here as well. 
The court of appeals in Cariou states, “A secondary work may 
modify the original without being transformative.  For instance, a 
derivative work that merely presents the same material but in a 
new form, such as a book of synopses of [television] shows, is not 
transformative.”197  On this view, the issue seems to be whether the 
work is transformative enough, or in the right way—that merely 
derivative works do not have a “new expression” or “employ new 
aesthetics.”  Whether this is meant to be a difference merely in 
degree, or a difference in kind, is not clear.  Either way, however, 
it seems very odd to suggest that the difference between a work 
and a written summary of that work does not so qualify.  Although 
all too many students will happily read synopses, say, of 
Shakespeare’s plays, rather than the originals, I think we can all 
agree that Hamlet and the CliffsNotes summary of the same differ 
 
 195 See id. § 101 (emphasis added). 
 196 See id. § 107. 
197  Cariou v. Prince, No. 11-1197-cv (2d Cir. Apr. 25, 2013). 
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wildly in their aesthetic character.  And although Seinfeld might 
not rise to the level of Shakespeare, the same principle would seem 
to hold here. 
The court in Castle Rock v. Carol Publishing stated that 
“derivative works that are subject to the author’s copyright 
transform an original work into a new mode of presentation.”198 
The court in Warner Bros. v. RDR Books states, “[t]he statutory 
language seeks to protect works that are ‘recast, transformed, or 
adapted’ into another medium, mode, language, or revised version, 
while still representing the ‘original work of authorship.’”199 These 
are still fairly high-order analyses, however, which would require 
substantial unpacking of their own.  What is a “mode of 
presentation”?  What constitutes a “revised version”?  Paul 
Goldstein argues that a derivative work is created through 
transformation whenever it creates a “new work for a different 
market.”200  But what constitutes this creation of a “new work”?  In 
the case of Mirage v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., the court of appeals 
found that affixing copyrighted photographs, cut from a book, to 
ceramic tiles creates a violating derivative work: 
By removing the individual images from the book 
and placing them on the tiles, perhaps the appellant 
has not accomplished reproduction.  We conclude, 
though, that appellant has certainly recast or 
transformed the individual images by incorporating 
them into its tile-preparing process.201 
However, less than a decade later, in a case nearly identical in 
substance, the court in Lee v. A.R.T. Co. argued that simply 
mounting a note card on a tile backing does not result in a 
derivative work: 
[T]he copyrighted note cards and lithographs were 
not “transformed” in the slightest.  The art was 
 
 198 Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 143 n.9 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 199 Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008). 
 200 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.3.1 (2nd ed., 
1996). 
 201 Mirage v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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bonded to a slab of ceramic, but it was not changed 
in the process.  It still depicts exactly what it 
depicted when it left Lee’s studio.  If mounting 
works is a “transformation,” then changing a 
painting’s frame or a photograph’s mat equally 
produces a derivative work.202 
That is, since we do not want to say that the mere reframing of 
a work constitutes the creation of a new, derivative work, 
transformation cannot consist in this.203  But, to dig a little further 
into the issue, let us consider another series of works by Jeff 
Koons. 
For his 1985 “Equilibrium” exhibition, Koons purchased Nike 
posters from the manufacturer—two of each—framed them, and 
presented them as his own works.204  The original posters created 
by brothers Tock and John Costacos depict 1980s sports icons in 
quasi-mythic poses.205  The Costacos Brothers’ poster of basketball 
legend Moses Malone, for instance, shows the player holding a 
staff and parting a sea of basketballs over a legend reading 
“MOSES.”206  Koons’ work, Moses, consists of a copy of the 
original poster in a simple wooden frame.207  The frame was not 
incidental to the work, however.  Koons notes: “The framing was 
very important.  I spent a lot of time choosing the material and the 
color.”208  The frame is a part of Koons’ work, and not merely a 
 
 202 Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 203 See Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d at 1343 (holding that by borrowing and 
mounting preexisting, copyrighted individual art images without the consent of the 
copyright proprietors, appellant had prepared a derivative work and infringed the 
proprietors’ copyrights). 
 204 See Tamara Warren, New Exhibit: The Costacos Brothers For the Kids, FORBES 
(Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tamarawarren/2012/01/18/new-exhibit-the-
costacos-brothers-for-the-kids/ (“For “Equilibrium” Koons appropriated images from 
Nike poster advertisements . . . .”). 
 205 See id. (“The Nike posters [depict images] in which the sports stars are shown to 
have supernatural abilities.”). 
 206 See Jeffrey Koons’ Basketball Poster Switch-Up, Bread City Basketball, 
http://breadcity.org/tag/costacos-brothers/ (depicting the original Costacos Brothers’ 
poster of Moses Malone). 
 207 See Jeff Koons-Moses, CHRISTIE’S, http://www.christies.com/lotfinder/lot/jeff-
koons-moses-1789213-details.aspx?intObjectID=1789213 (last visited Feb. 1, 2013) 
(showing Koon’s work that sold at auction). 
 208 JEFF KOONS, JEFF KOONS: PICTURES 1980–2002 19 (Thomas Kellein, ed., 2002) 
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means of displaying the Costacos Brothers’ poster—it was selected 
and arranged with the poster as essential to the work.209 
Certainly, there is something interesting going on here.  At the 
very least, Koons thinks he has created a new work.  Offering an 
interpretation of Moses, he says: 
Equilibrium is unattainable, it can be sustained only 
for a moment.  And here are these people in the role 
of saying, “Come on! I’ve done it! I’m a star! I’m 
Moses!”  It’s about artists using art for social 
mobility.  Moses [Malone] is a symbol of the 
middle-class artist of our time who does the same 
act of deception, a front man: “I’ve done it! I’m a 
star!”210 
“People were shocked,” Koons reports, “that I was asking 1000 
dollars for a framed Nike poster.”211 But Koons was not merely 
selling a copy of the Costacos Brothers’ poster; he was selling an 
edition of his work, Moses.  And Koons isn’t the only one who 
sees it this way.  The original Nike poster of Moses Malone 
occasionally shows up for sale on eBay for about forty dollars.  
One of the two editions of Koons’ Moses sold at auction in 2004 
for $78,000.212  To buy a copy of the original poster is certainly not 
to purchase an edition of Koons’ work.213  Moses is in part 
composed of the original poster, but Koons’ work is something 
distinct from it, in the same way that Duchamp’s Fountain is 
 
 209 See Darren Hudson Hick, Finding a Foundation: Copyright and the Creative Act, 17 
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 363, 376 (2009). 
 210 Klaus Ottman, Jeff Koons, 1 J. CONTEMPORARY ART 18 (1988), available at 
http://www.jca-online.com/koons.html.; see also Katy Siegel, Jeff Koons Talks to Katy 
Siegel, 41 ARTFORUM 252, 253 (2003).  
 211 KOONS, supra note 208, at 19. 
 212 Stephen Perloff, Lambert Sale a Smashing Success as Records Fall for Contemp 
Work, 82 E-PHOTO NEWSLETTER, December 10, 2004, available at 
http://www.iphotocentral.com/news/article_view.php/88/82/441. 
 213 Although I am centrally restricting my discussion in this article to the issue of 
transformation, this matter also bears on the fourth factor of fair use: the effect of the 
secondary use on the market value of the original.  On the interpretation that uses which 
suppress sales of the original are allowable while those that usurp the sales of the original 
are not, no reasonable person simply seeking to obtain a copy of the Nike poster would 
purchase a copy of Koons’ work at several thousand times the original poster’s price. 
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distinct from the porcelain urinal of which it is composed.214  Put 
simply, while the Nike poster is about Moses Malone, Koons’ 
work is about (among other things) the Nike poster itself (and, 
importantly, this could be true even if Koons had not selected a 
frame, but had simply appropriated the poster itself).  Insofar as 
what the work is about is, at least in part, determined by the idea 
expressed in that work, Koons’ work expresses an idea distinct 
from that of the original, and so, as an expression is indexical to its 
idea, Koons’ expression is, strictly speaking, distinct from that of 
the Costacos Brothers.  And so, in this sense, Koons has 
transformed the original work. 
VI. A PROPOSAL 
Whether some work is independently copyrightable depends 
centrally upon whether it constitutes an original work of 
authorship, and this is established within the law on formal and 
causal grounds.215  That is, a work constitutes an original work of 
authorship if it is formally distinct from all preexisting works, or 
includes material not copied from any preexisting work, assuming 
that what sets the new work apart from others meets a fairly 
minimal bar of originality.216  If an item is formally 
indistinguishable from, and is entirely copied from, some work, 
then that item simply counts as an instance of that preexisting 
work.217  As such, although I argue that two works will constitute 
different expressions, strictly speaking, so long as they are 
employed as expressions of distinct ideas (even if the resulting 
expressions are visually, textually, or sonically indistinguishable), 
where one is entirely and completely copied from the other, the 
newer of the works would not qualify as “original” within the law, 
 
 214 See Arthur Danto, The Artworld, 61 J. OF PHILOSOPHY 571 (1964). 
 215 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a) (2006) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with 
this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”). 
 216 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) 
(“Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently 
created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at 
least some minimal degree of creativity.”). 
 217 For a more detailed analysis see Hick, supra note 191. 
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and so would not be independently copyrightable.218  However, to 
whatever degree the new work appropriates from the preexisting 
work, where the new work is used to express some distinct idea, I 
would suggest that such a use be recognized as transformative and 
so presumptively fair. 
As a finding of fair use does not in itself recognize a copyright 
in the new expression, the appropriation artist who entirely and 
accurately copies her work from some preexisting work will obtain 
no right to make further copies of the work, nor to license further 
derivative works based upon it.219  Rather, she will gain only a 
finding of fair use in her copy.220  Where the new expression is not 
entirely copied from preexisting works, the appropriation artist 
would gain copyright ownership in what was not copied,221 where 
this new material itself meets the law’s minimum bar of originality 
(there is, after all, a back-side to String of Puppies), with all of the 
associated rights thereof.222  However, as with cases of complete 
appropriation, the use here should be found to be fair where it is 
employed in the expression of an idea distinct from that of the 
original. 
On this understanding, there is no essential difference between 
the notion of transformation employed in the definition of 
“derivative work” and that employed in fair use evaluation.  Where 
a new work is based on a transformation of some preexisting work, 
it will constitute a derivative work (on the condition that it 
constitutes a new work at all under the law).  But where this 
transformation is in service of expressing some distinct idea, this 
use will be presumptively fair. 
Now, what of the slippery slope worry raised in Rogers v. 
Koons—that, if a use could be judged fair solely on the basis that 
 
 218 See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). 
 219 See A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC., 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009).  
 220 See id. 
 221 See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2006) (“The copyright in a . . . derivative work extends only 
to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the 
preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the 
preexisting material.”). 
 222 This would do little for Prince in the case of Canal Zone, however, as nearly every 
part of the work is copied from some work of Cariou’s, leaving him little to further copy 
or license. 
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the secondary user claims a higher or different artistic purpose, 
there would be no practicable boundary to the fair use defense?223 
Where this purpose constitutes the expression of a new idea, 
however, isn’t the promotion of this the avowed purpose of 
copyright law? The Constitutional foundation to copyright states, 
“The Congress shall have power [. . .] to Promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”224 As standardly interpreted, the right of copyright 
exists to promote the progress of mankind’s body of knowledge, 
or, as Donald Diefenbach puts it, “to expand the marketplace of 
ideas.”225  Isn’t this precisely what Koons and the other 
appropriation artists are attempting to do? While copyrightability 
rests centrally on an author’s expression, and not on her ideas 
expressed, I would suggest that, given the intended function of 
copyright law in general and the fair use doctrine in particular, it is 
worth considering a secondary author’s ideas in determining 
whether her use is fair.  And while it would perhaps be ideal on 
this understanding to require for a finding of fair use that the 
secondary work express some new idea, such a requirement would 
undoubtedly place an enormous burden on the law.226  Instead, I 
suggest only for such a use to be presumptively fair that the 
secondary use be in service of expressing some idea distinct from 
that of the original.  However, my proposal still requires a fairly 
high degree of sensitivity on the part of the courts. 
In the case of Cariou v. Prince, the district court found that 
Prince’s purpose in creating Canal Zone was the same as that of 
Cariou’s in the original photographs: to “communicate to the 
viewer core truths about Rastafarians and their culture.”227  What 
the court failed to consider important was whether Cariou and 
Prince sought to communicate the same core truths, and this seems 
a critical matter.  Both purposes and ideas can be described in 
 
 223 See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310. 
 224 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 225 Donald L. Diefenbach, The Constitutional and Moral Justifications for Copyright, 8 
PUB. AFFAIRS. Q. 225, 226 (1994). 
 226 I advanced an even more stringent proposal in Hick, supra note 47, at 415–20. 
 227 Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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varying degrees of specificity, and at an abstract enough level all 
authored works perform the same function: expression.  However, 
it is very often the more detailed, nuanced levels that interest us, 
that expand the marketplace of ideas.  Are the ideas expressed in 
Canal Zone importantly distinct from those expressed in Yes, 
Rasta?  Here, the court notes: 
In creating the Paintings, Prince did not intend to 
comment on any aspects of the original works or on 
the broader culture.  Prince’s intent in creating the 
Canal Zone paintings was to pay homage or tribute 
to other painters, including Picasso, Cezanne, 
Warhol, and de Kooning, and to create beautiful 
artworks which related to musical themes and to a 
post-apocalyptic screenplay he was writing which 
featured a reggae band.  Prince intended to 
emphasize themes of equality of the sexes; highlight 
“the three relationships in the world, which are men 
and women, men and men, and women and 
women”; and portray a contemporary take on the 
music scene.228 
How the court could reduce this to a purpose to “communicate 
to the viewer core truths about Rastafarians and their culture” 
boggles the mind, and clearly for my proposal to operate, works 
would have to be considered at a reasonable enough degree of 
specificity to distinguish the ideas genuinely expressed in the 
works in question.  In taking up the Cariou case, the appeals court 
makes note of substantial differences between Prince’s works and 
Cariou’s: 
These twenty-five of Prince’s artworks manifest an 
entirely different aesthetic from Cariou’s 
photographs.  Where Cariou’s serene and 
deliberately composed portraits and landscape 
photographs depict the natural beauty of 
Rastafarians and their surrounding environs, 
Prince’s crude and jarring works, on the other hand, 
are hectic and provocative.  Cariou’s black-and-
 
 228 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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white photographs were printed in a 9 1/2" x 12" 
book.  Prince has created collages on canvas that 
incorporates color, feature distorted human and 
other forms and settings, and measure between ten 
and nearly a hundred times the size of the 
photographs.  Prince’s composition, presentation, 
scale, color palette, and media are fundamentally 
different and new compared to the photographs, as 
is the expressive nature of Prince’s work.229 
Notably, all of these differences are, or arise from, differences 
that the court sees in the form of the respective works.  Judge 
Wallace, in his partial dissent to the court’s opinion, notes that, 
according to the majority, “all the Court needs to do here to 
determine transformativeness is view the original work and the 
secondary work and, apparently, employ its own artistic 
judgment.”230  Wallace is rightly incredulous of this position: 
transformation need not be apparent on a work’s surface.  The 
courts, I take it, would very much like it if cases could be decided 
simply by looking at the works before them.  Unfortunately for the 
courts, neither art nor copyright works that way, and nor should 
they.  So, certainly, there is work to be done. 
One of the great assets of the present Copyright Act is that it 
was designed to accommodate future forms of art and technology 
not predicted by its authors at the time of its framing.  Although 
Sturtevant was active when the Act was written, she was far from 
well known—and it seems safe to assume that none of the Act’s 
authors were familiar with the fictional Hank Herron.  However, 
appropriation art has since grown to become one of the most 
fascinating—and most influential—movements in contemporary 
art.  As such, given the instrumental purpose of copyright law as 
encoded in the Constitution, it seems incumbent upon the law to 
seek to find a way of accommodating appropriation art within its 
boundaries.  What I suggest here is a conceptual framework for 
understanding how the law might do just this by recognizing how 
the appropriation artist transforms what she takes.  Herron’s 
 
229  Cariou v. Prince, No. 11-1197-cv (2d Cir. Apr. 25, 2013). 
230  Id. 
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imagined art, appropriated from Frank Stella, transformed Stella’s 
work.  A painting by Herron expressed an idea distinct from that of 
a visually-indiscernible Stella, even if Herron’s idea was simply a 
denial of his own originality. 
 
